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THE CASE FOR STREAMLINING EMERGENCY
DECLARATION AUTHORITIES AND ADAPTING LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS TO EVER-CHANGING PUBLIC
HEALTH THREATS
Gregory Sunshine*
INTRODUCTION
Disasters can come from unforeseeable sources and create unforeseeable
problems. The nation’s response system is built to be flexible and responsive to
all threats, including those we cannot predict. As a result, federal, state, and
local governments adopted the National Incident Management System (NIMS),
a framework developed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for
responding to all forms of emergencies, including terrorist attacks,1 natural
disasters,2 oil spills,3 and emerging infectious diseases.4 NIMS’s defining
characteristics—a clear chain of command and flexible organizational
structure—allow it to adapt to any situation.5

*
Public Health Analyst with Cherokee Nation Assurance serving the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), Office for State, Tribal, Local and Territorial Support, Public Health Law Program (PHLP).
J.D., University of Maryland School of Law. Research was also supported by Chenega Professional &
Technical Services, LLC. PHLP provides technical assistance and public health law resources to advance the
use of law as a public health tool. PHLP cannot provide legal advice on any issue and cannot represent any
individual or entity in any matter. PHLP recommends seeking the advice of an attorney or other qualified
professional with questions regarding the application of law to a specific circumstance. The findings and
conclusions in this summary are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official views of CDC.
The author thanks Matthew Penn, J.D., MLIS, Director, Public Health Law Program, Office for State,
Tribal, Local and Territorial Support, CDC, and Rose Meltzer, MPH (2018), The George Washington
University, for their editorial assistance.
1
“ICS provides a flexible core mechanism for coordinated and collaborative incident management,
whether for incidents where additional resources are required or are provided from different organizations
within a single jurisdiction or outside the jurisdiction, or for complex incidents with national implications
(such as an emerging infectious disease or a bioterrorism attack).” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 45 (2008).
2
Cf. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, HURRICANE SANDY FEMA AFTER-ACTION REPORT (2013).
3
See FLA. COMM’N ON OIL SPILL RESPONSE COORDINATION, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE USE OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM IN THE DEEPWATER HORIZON (DWH) INCIDENT 15 (2012).
4
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 1, at 45.
5
“NIMS is based on the premise that use of a common incident management framework will give
emergency management/response personnel a flexible but standardized system for emergency management
and incident response activities. NIMS is flexible because the system components can be utilized to develop
plans, processes, procedures, agreements, and roles for all types of incidents; it is applicable to any incident
regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. Additionally, NIMS provides an organized set of
standardized operational structures, which is critical in allowing disparate organizations and agencies to work
together in a predictable, coordinated manner.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 1, at 6.
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While NIMS creates a clear structure for emergency response, state and
local responders must still operate within their respective jurisdiction’s legal
system. The law establishes both the powers and limitations for how
government officials protect citizens’ health and well-being.6 While many laws
have been drafted specifically for the benefit of responding to disasters,7
complex and inflexible legal structures might impede efficient and effective
responses.8 To minimize this impact, streamlined and flexible legal systems are

6
Public health law is “the study of the legal powers and duties of the state . . . to ensure the conditions
for people to be healthy and of the limitations on the power of the state to constrain the autonomy, privacy,
liberty, proprietary, or other legally protected interests of individuals.” LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH
LAW AND ETHICS: A READER 9 (rev. 2d ed. 2010) (citation omitted).
7
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 26.23.010 (West 2007) (“The purposes of this chapter are to
(1) reduce the vulnerability of people and communities of this state to damage, injury, and loss of life and
property resulting from a disaster; (2) prepare for the prompt and efficient rescue, care, and treatment of
persons victimized or threatened by a disaster; . . .”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 46-1003 (West Supp. 2016) (“It is
the policy of this state to plan and prepare for disasters and emergencies resulting from natural or man-made
causes, enemy attack, terrorism, sabotage or other hostile action, and to implement this policy, it is found
necessary: (1) To create an Idaho office of emergency management, to authorize the creation of local
organizations for disaster preparedness in the political subdivisions of the state, and to authorize the state and
political subdivisions to execute agreements and to cooperate with the federal government and the
governments of other states. (2) To prevent and reduce damage, injury, and loss of life and property resulting
from natural or man-made catastrophes, riots, or hostile military or paramilitary action. (3) To prepare
assistance for prompt and efficient search, rescue, care, and treatment of persons injured, victimized or
threatened by disaster.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-14-03-7(a)(1)–(3) (West 2016) (“Because of the existing and
increasing possibility of disasters or emergencies of unprecedented size and destructiveness that may result
from manmade or natural causes, to ensure that Indiana will be adequately prepared to deal with disasters or
emergencies or to prevent or mitigate those disasters where possible, generally to provide for the common
defense, to protect the public peace, health, and safety, and to preserve the lives and property of the people of
the state, it is found and declared to be necessary: (1) to provide for emergency management under the
department of homeland security; (2) to create local emergency management departments and to authorize and
direct disaster and emergency management functions in the political subdivisions of the state; (3) to confer
upon the governor and upon the executive heads or governing bodies of the political subdivisions of the state
the emergency powers provided in this chapter; . . .”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.010 (West 2015) (“It is the
intent of the General Assembly to establish and to support a statewide comprehensive emergency management
program for the Commonwealth, and through it an integrated emergency management system, in order to
provide for adequate assessment and mitigation of, preparation for, response to, and recovery from, the threats
to public safety and the harmful effects or destruction resulting from all major hazards . . . .”); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 33-15-2(2) (West 1999) (“It is the intent of the Legislature to reduce the vulnerability of the people and
property of this state; to prepare for efficient evacuation and shelter of threatened or affected persons; to
provide for the rapid and orderly provision of relief to persons and for the coordination of activities relating to
emergency preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation among and between agencies and officials of this
state, with similar agencies and officials of other states, with local and federal governments, with interstate
organizations and with the private sector.”).
8
“During an emergency, laws serve crucial functions, including clarifying responsibilities, authorizing
critical interventions, and protecting vulnerable populations. However, provisions of existing laws designed for
normal, non-emergency circumstances may sometimes hinder emergency response efforts, thereby potentially
endangering the public’s health rather than protecting it.” Daniel G. Orenstein, When Law Is Not Law: Setting
Aside Legal Provisions During Declared Emergencies, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 73, 73 (2013).
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vital to address the unforeseeable circumstances that disasters create.9
Centralized emergency response authorities and emergency declarations can
act more efficiently than separate groups of officials and various types of
emergency declarations.10 Further, an adaptable legal system requires the
ability to remove legal barriers. A streamlined and adaptable emergency
response legal system allows disaster responders to react as quickly and
efficiently as possible in our world of ever-changing threats.11
This Article makes the case for streamlining emergency declaration
authority and creating an adaptable legal system. Part I describes the utility of
emergency declarations, but gives examples of how that utility can be
diminished when states divide specific emergency powers across various types
of declarations.12 Part II explores gubernatorial emergency powers to suspend
or waive laws as an adaptable solution for removing legal barriers to an
efficient and effective emergency response.13 These arguments demonstrate
that a streamlined and adaptable state legal system for emergency response is
one that (1) provides a governor with the authority to issue one type of
emergency declaration, (2) does not divide vital authorities across various
declaration types, and (3) provides a governor with the unilateral power to
remove statutory and regulatory barriers to an effective response.
I.

STREAMLINED EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS ARE NECESSARY TO
ACTIVATE ALTERNATIVE LEGAL PROCEDURES

Emergency powers are a fundamental tool in legal preparedness.14
However, legal mechanisms for activating these powers through emergency

9
Id. at 74 (“The multifaceted nature of waiver authority during declared emergencies illustrates the
critical role such declarations play in effective response. Something as simple as a toll or payment schedule
can impact response, and more complex systems (e.g., professional licensure) can inhibit volunteer assistance.
Inclusion of waiver provisions in states’ emergency preparedness laws gives officials the flexibility to adapt to
unanticipated and volatile circumstances.”).
10
See infra Part I; see also James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., The Legal Framework for Meeting Surge
Capacity Through the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During Public Health Emergencies and Other
Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 5, 23 (2005) (“Some states allow for the dual declaration of
public health emergencies and general emergencies. These states face the potential for legislative confusion
and duplication of efforts, which may detract from the implementation of efficient emergency management
functions.”).
11
See Hodge, supra note 10, at 23.
12
See infra Part I.
13
See infra Part II.
14
See COMM. ON GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE FOR USE IN DISASTER
SITUATIONS, BD. OF HEALTH SCIS. POLICY, CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE: A SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK FOR
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declarations can be complex,15 situation dependent,16 and divided among
specific executive officials.17 Leadership turnover can also exacerbate
confusion by creating knowledge gaps about which officials can exercise what
authorities in which situations.18 While emergency declaration powers provide
a foundation for emergency response, a disparate system of state emergency
declaration powers can create a gap in legal preparedness.
Emergency declarations provide government responders with vital tools to
address the threats posed by disasters. State emergency declaration powers
exist thanks to policymakers determining that—to respond to large-scale
threats to the health and well-being of citizens—governors need special
authorities for the purposes of mitigating the effects of such threats.19 These
“all-hazards” declarations—referred to by a variety of names, including “state
of emergency,”20 “disaster,”21 or “emergency,”22—trigger powers that can be
used to activate state emergency plans,23 activate the state’s national guard,24
and authorize the use of broad powers, including the power to commandeer
property and supplies for government use.25 All-hazards declarations can be
contrasted with “public health emergencies” and “multi-level declarations.”
Public health emergency declarations are specific emergency declarations that
are limited to certain types of threats, such as diseases; multi-level declarations

CATASTROPHIC DISASTER RESPONSE 1–57 (2012) (discussing the challenges to the legal environment posed by
a declared emergency).
15
See infra pages 399–402.
16
See infra pages 403–06.
17
See infra pages 399–402.
18
James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage During Public
Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 269 (2008) (“Duplicate state-emergency declarations
add redundancy, complexity, and confusion to already muddied channels of communication, control, and
accountability. Different state or local agencies may be legislatively or administratively responsible for
coordinating simultaneous responses depending on the type of emergency declared. Thus, these statutory
enactments can lead to confusion because they may vest similar authorities in divergent governmental agents,
fail to set priorities for action when more than one governmental entity is authorized to respond, or grant
conflicting powers.”).
19
Rebecca Haffajee et al., What Is a Public Health “Emergency”?, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 986, 986
(2014) (“State laws providing public health emergency powers permit designated officials—typically
governors and their top health officers—to take extraordinary legal actions. The laws provide flexibility in
responding to emergency situations, when adherence to ordinary legal standards and processes could cost
lives.”).
20
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8558(b) (West 2012).
21
See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 29:723(2) (West Supp. 2016).
22
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.020(12) (West 2015).
23
See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.015(a) (West 2012).
24
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.36(4) (West 2017).
25
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-925(c)(4) (West 2008).
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are based on the intensity of the threat or level of destruction.26 Public health
emergency and multi-level declarations can create complexity for an
emergency response system by imbuing officials other than the governor—
such as state health officials—with the power to declare emergencies and by
limiting certain governmental powers—which may be necessary during all
disasters—to specific types of disasters.27 The creation of disparate emergency
declaration types creates an unnecessary legal complexity that could burden
disaster planners and responders and hinder rapid and effective emergency
response.
Florida’s recent response to the Zika virus outbreak demonstrated both the
utility of emergency declaration authorities and the complexity created by
disparate types of emergency declarations. Florida’s first cases of travel-related
Zika virus infection were announced on January 19, 2016.28 On February 3,
Florida Governor Rick Scott issued an emergency declaration to address the
threat of Zika in the state.29 In the declaration, Governor Scott ordered a
number of emergency response actions, including designating the state health
department as the agency in charge of coordinating the response, instructing all
state agencies under the governor’s direction to cooperate with the state health
department, and requesting that agencies not under the governor’s direction do
the same.30 Additionally, the governor ordered the state’s Department of
Environmental Protection and its Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission
to “support the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services in any way
as it develops extensive mosquito control plans to contain the spread of
[Zika].”31 By using these authorities, the governor established a clear chain of
command for interagency cooperation.

26
“Some states may authorize the declaration of specific exigencies, which include ‘state of war
emergency,’ ‘major emergency,’ ‘civil preparedness emergency,’ ‘manmade emergency,’ ‘natural emergency,’
‘technological emergency,’ ‘catastrophe,’ and ‘energy emergency.’” Hodge & Anderson, supra note 18, at
263–64.
27
See supra note 18.
28
Kara Dapena et al., Miami-Dade County Hit Hard, MIAMI HERALD, http://www.miamiherald.com/
news/health-care/article66790817.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2017); Carli Teproff, Two Cases of the Zika Virus
Found in Miami-Dade, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 19, 2016, 8:34 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/healthcare/article55538970.html.
29
Fla. Exec. Order No. 16-29 (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/EO1629.
pdf.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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The governor issued another Zika emergency declaration four months later
on June 23.32 The new declaration greatly expanded the list of affected
counties covered by the initial emergency declaration and activated additional
vital emergency powers related to funding the response activities.33 One such
power, codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.37(2), states that:
If the Governor finds that the demands placed upon [emergency
management] funds in coping with a particular disaster declared by
the Governor as a state of emergency are unreasonably great, she or
he may make funds available by transferring and expending moneys
appropriated for other purposes, by transferring and expending
moneys out of any unappropriated surplus funds, or from the Budget
Stabilization Fund.34

By activating this authority, the Governor diverted $26.2 million in state funds
to the response efforts.35 As of October 2016, shortly after Congress passed the
Zika Response and Preparedness Act,36 at least $73.2 million in state funds had
been diverted to Florida’s efforts to combat Zika.37 This allocation relied
32
Fla. Exec. Order No. 16-149 (June 23, 2016), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2016/
EO_16-149.pdf. The June 23, 2016 declaration was a new emergency declaration, rather than a renewal of the
previous declaration. Per Florida law, emergency declarations automatically expire after 60 days, unless
renewed by the governor. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.36(2) (West 2017). As a result, the governor’s first Zika
emergency declaration expired on April 3, 2016. The June 23, 2016 declaration, issued after the initial
declaration had expired, has been continuously renewed within the sixty-day window as of October 3, 2017.
See Fla. Exec. Order No. 17-260 (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2017/EO_
17-260.pdf; Fla. Exec. Order No. 17-211 (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/
2017/EO_17-211.pdf; Fla. Exec. Order No. 17-115 (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/
uploads/orders/2017/EO_17-115.pdf; Fla. Exec. Order No. 17-43 (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.flgov.com/wpcontent/uploads/orders/2017/EO_17-43.pdf; Fla. Exec. Order No. 16-288 (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.flgov.
com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2016/EO_16-288.pdf; Fla. Exec. Order No. 16-233 (Oct. 18, 2016),
http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2016/EO_16-233.pdf; Fla. Exec. Order No. 16-193
(Aug. 19, 2016), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2016/EO_16-193.pdf; Fla. Exec. Order No.
16-149 (June 23, 2016), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2016/EO_16-149.pdf .
33
Fla. Exec. Order No. 16-149 (June 23, 2016).
34
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.37(2) (West 2017).
35
News Release, Rick Scott, Governor of Fla., Following Washington’s Failure to Authorize Federal
Zika Funding, Gov. Scott to Allocate $26.2 Million for Zika Preparedness (June 23, 2016), http://www.flgov.
com/2016/06/23/following-washingtons-failure-to-authorize-federal-zika-funding-gov-scott-to-allocate-26-2million-for-zika-preparedness/.
36
Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 114–223, 130 Stat. 857
(2016).
37
Governor Scott announced the money to be spent over the course of four months as follows: $26.2
million on June 23; $5 million on August 22; $10 million on September 16; $25 million on September 22; and
$7 million on October 11. News Release, Rick Scott, Governor of Fla., Gov. Scott: Additional $7 Million
Allocated to Miami-Dade County to Combat Spread of Zika (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.flgov.com/2016/10/11/govscott-additional-7-million-allocated-to-miami-dade-county-to-combat-spread-of-zika-2/; News Release, Rick
Scott, Governor of Fla., Gov. Scott Authorizes $25 Million in State Funds for Zika Virus Vaccine Research
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entirely on the Governor’s use of emergency declarations as a vital legal
mechanism to combat the threat that was facing the state.
At the same time, Florida’s use of emergency response authorities in the
fight against Zika demonstrated how disjointed executive authorities can
complicate an emergency response. Like other states that have emergency
declaration authorities unique to certain threats,38 Florida allows specific
authorities to be invoked only during a declared public health emergency.
Florida defines a public health emergency as “any occurrence, or threat
thereof, whether natural or manmade, which results or may result in substantial
injury or harm to the public health from infectious disease, chemical agents,
nuclear agents, biological toxins, or situations involving mass casualties or
natural disasters.”39 The only party that may declare a public health emergency
is the State Health Officer, who must consult with the governor if possible
before doing so.40 Without a public health emergency declaration from the
State Health Officer, officials cannot use unique emergency response
authorities, including issuing orders to allocate prescription drugs to certain
geographic areas, temporarily reactivating certain healthcare practitioners’
licenses, or ordering individuals to be examined, tested, vaccinated, treated,
isolated, or quarantined.41
Florida’s two-declaration approach required Governor Scott, in his
February and June 2016 emergency declarations, to “direct the State Health
Officer and Surgeon General, Dr. John Armstrong, to declare a public health
emergency” in the affected counties.42 Complying with this order, Dr.
Armstrong issued a public health emergency declaration, ordering a meeting of

and Development (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.flgov.com/2016/09/22/gov-scott-authorizes-25-million-instate-funds-for-zika-virus-vaccine-research-and-development/; News Release, Rick Scott, Governor of Fla.,
Gov. Scott: In Absence of Federal Action, State Allocating $10 Million More to Fight Zika (Sept. 16, 2016),
http://www.flgov.com/2016/09/16/gov-scott-in-absence-of-federal-action-state-allocating-10-million-more-tofight-zika/; News Release, Rick Scott, Governor of Fla., Gov. Scott: We Will Provide $5 Million in Additional
Zika Preparedness Funding to Miami-Dade County (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.flgov.com/2016/08/22/
gov-scott-we-will-provide-5-million-in-additional-zika-preparedness-funding-to-miami-dade-county/;
News Release, Rick Scott, Governor of Fla., supra note 35.
38
See Lainie Rutkow et al., The Public Health Workforce and Willingness to Respond to Emergencies:
A 50-State Analysis of Potentially Influential Laws, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 64, 66–67 (2014) (discussing states
that have specific powers tied to public health emergency declarations).
39
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.00315(1)(c) (West Supp. 2017).
40
Id.
41
Id. § 381.00315(1)(c)(1)–(4).
42
Fla. Exec. Order No. 16-149 (June 23, 2016), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/
2016/EO_16-149.pdf; Fla. Exec. Order No. 16-29 (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/
orders/2016/EO_16-29.pdf.
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representatives from various county agencies and boards for affected counties,
the development of action plans by each county health officer to be submitted
to state health department’s incident command offices, and the development of
“an outreach program for local medical professionals to increase awareness
and access to diagnostic tools.”43 As Zika spread, Dr. Armstrong issued an
additional public health emergency declaration extending the same
requirements to newly affected counties.44 Media outlets widely misreported
Dr. Armstrong’s declaration as a public health emergency declaration by the
Governor, thus demonstrating the confusion that having two unique types of
declarations can create.45 Although Florida’s response to Zika did not require
issuance of quarantine orders or reactivation of healthcare professionals’
licenses, had those actions been necessary, media reports likely would have
indicated that those public health emergency-specific authorities had been
activated and ready for use when that was not, in fact, the case.
The challenges that this kind of system poses go beyond semantics. A
jurisdiction can be best prepared by integrating legal authorities seamlessly
into plans, exercises, and procedures. This integration must clearly and
comprehensively describe when and how those powers may be used. Consider
a state whose emergency plan has processes to reactivate healthcare licenses—
including those of retired healthcare professionals—during an emergency, and
included those reactivations in its exercises. That state would train its leaders
and medical community to consider a public health emergency as a trigger for
licensure reactivation. If response leaders then heard in a real-world event—
either through the media or by word of mouth—that the governor had declared
43
Press Release, Fla. Dep’t of Health, Declaration of Public Health Emergency (Feb. 3, 2016),
http://www.floridahealth.gov/_documents/newsroom/press-releases/2016/02/020416-declaration-publichealth-emergency.pdf?utm_source=article.
44
Press Release, Fla. Dep’t of Health, Declaration of Public Health Emergency (Feb. 17, 2016).
http://www.floridahealth.gov/diseases-and-conditions/zika-virus/_documents/021716-declaration-fo-publichealth-emergency-2-17-16.pdf.
45
See, e.g., Greg Allen, Florida Governor Ramps Up Mosquito Fight to Stay Ahead of Zika, NPR (Feb.
4, 2016, 6:42 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/02/04/465575180/florida-governor-rampsup-mosquito-fight-to-stay-ahead-of-zika (“In response, Florida’s Gov. Rick Scott has declared a public health
emergency in five counties in hopes of getting ahead of the virus’s spread.”); Korin Miller, Florida Declares
Zika Public Health Emergency: What Does That Mean, Exactly?, YAHOO NEWS (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.
yahoo.com/beauty/florida-zika-public-health-emergency-140738703.html (“Florida’s governor has issued a
public health emergency in four of the state’s counties after nine residents who had traveled to the Caribbean
and Latin America were diagnosed with the Zika virus.”); Florida Governor Declares Health Emergency in
Four Counties over Zika, REUTERS, Feb. 3, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-zikaflorida/florida-governor-declares-health-emergency-in-four-counties-over-zika-idUSKCN0VC2S9 (“Florida
Governor Rick Scott declared a public health emergency in four counties with travel-related cases of the Zika
virus on Wednesday, and ordered state officials to increase mosquito control efforts in some of the most
populous parts of the state.”).
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a public health emergency, they would, at best, have to clarify whether the
licensure reactivation power had been activated. At worst, they could assume
that they may begin contacting retired healthcare practitioners.
Disparate emergency declarations can also obfuscate legally mandated
protections for emergency responders and healthcare providers participating in
response activities. For example, following Hurricane Katrina, many in the
field of emergency response law called for increasing liability protections for
healthcare providers who participate in emergency response activities.46 They
argued that healthcare providers are more willing to serve in dangerous and
distressing situations when they are protected from liability.47 Maryland began
providing these liability protections by passing the Catastrophic Health
Emergencies Act in 2011.48 Under the law, healthcare provider liability
protections are provided only upon the declaration of a “catastrophic health
emergency.”49 However, the Act conditions the declaration of a catastrophic
health emergency on a proclamation by the governor that “a situation in which
extensive loss of life or serious disability is threatened imminently because of
exposure to a deadly agent.”50 Unlike Florida, which includes natural disasters
in its definition of public health emergency, Maryland law defines a deadly
agent only as:
(1) anthrax, ebola, plague, smallpox, tularemia, or other bacterial,
fungal, rickettsial, or viral agent, biological toxin, or other
biological agent capable of causing extensive loss of life or
serious disability;
(2) mustard gas, nerve gas, or other chemical agent capable of
causing extensive loss of life or serious disability; or
(3) radiation at levels capable of causing extensive loss of life or
serious disability.51
In the case of a natural disaster—such as a blizzard or hurricane—the governor
would have to declare a “state of emergency” and activate a different set of
emergency powers.52 Since Maryland’s liability protection statute for
healthcare providers during disasters states that providers are “immune from
46
James G. Hodge, Jr., Law and the Public’s Health: Legal Issues Concerning Volunteer Health
Professionals and the Hurricane-Related Emergencies in the Gulf Coast Region, 121 PUB. HEALTH REP. 205,
205–06 (2006).
47
Rutkow et al., supra note 38, at 64, 68.
48
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14-3A-01–08 (West Supp. 2017).
49
Id. § 14-3A-06.
50
Id. § 14-3A-01(b) (emphasis added).
51
Id. § 14-3A-01(c).
52
See id. § 14-303(a).
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civil or criminal liability if the health care provider acts in good faith and under
a catastrophic health emergency proclamation,”53 such protections would not
apply during a state of emergency declared by the governor.54
Maryland’s volunteer healthcare provider disaster liability protections
stand in contrast to Virginia’s liability protections. Under Virginia law, a
healthcare provider is protected from liability during a state of emergency:
[A]ny healthcare provider who responds to a disaster shall not be
liable for any injury or wrongful death of any person arising from the
delivery . . . of healthcare when (i) a state or local emergency has
been . . . declared in response to such disaster, and (ii) the emergency
and subsequent conditions caused a lack of resources, attributable to
the disaster, rendering the healthcare provider unable to provide the
level or manner of care that otherwise would have been required in
the absence of the emergency and which resulted in the injury or
wrongful death at issue.55

This protection applies in any type of disaster, including weather-related,
biological, and man-made threats.56 Due to these different types of declarations
that activate disaster liability protections in Virginia and Maryland, if a
53

Id. § 14-3A-06 (emphasis added).
Id. § 14-303.
55
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225.02(A) (West 2017).
56
Id. § 8.01-225.02(B) (West 2017) (citation omitted) (“For purposes of this section: ‘Disaster’ means
any ‘disaster,’ ‘emergency,’ or ‘major disaster as those terms are used and defined in § 44-146.16.”); id. § 44146.16 (West 2014) (“‘Disaster’ means (i) any man-made disaster including any condition following an attack
by any enemy or foreign nation upon the United States resulting in substantial damage of property or injury to
persons in the United States and may be by use of bombs, missiles, shell fire, nuclear, radiological, chemical,
or biological means or other weapons or by overt paramilitary actions; terrorism, foreign and domestic; also
any industrial, nuclear, or transportation accident, explosion, conflagration, power failure, resources shortage,
or other condition such as sabotage, oil spills, and other injurious environmental contaminations that threaten
or cause damage to property, human suffering, hardship, or loss of life; and (ii) any natural disaster including
any hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, earthquake, drought, fire,
communicable disease of public health threat, or other natural catastrophe resulting in damage, hardship,
suffering, or possible loss of life; . . . ‘Emergency’ means any occurrence, or threat thereof, whether natural or
man-made, which results or may result in substantial injury or harm to the population or substantial damage to
or loss of property or natural resources and may involve governmental action beyond that authorized or
contemplated by existing law because governmental inaction for the period required to amend the law to meet
the exigency would work immediate and irrevocable harm upon the citizens or the environment of the
Commonwealth or some clearly defined portion or portions thereof; . . . ‘Major disaster’ means any natural
catastrophe, including any: hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami,
earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm or drought, or regardless of cause, any fire,
flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which, in the determination of the President of the United
States is, or thereafter determined to be, of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster
assistance under the Stafford Act (P.L. 93-288 as amended) to supplement the efforts and available resources
of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or
suffering caused thereby and is so declared by him.”).
54
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hurricane traveled up the Chesapeake Bay, caused Hurricane Katrina level
destruction, and both Virginia and Maryland declared emergencies, only
healthcare providers in Virginia would receive disaster liability protections, as
a hurricane would not qualify as a “deadly agent” under Maryland law. This
could cause confusion and a subsequent refusal by healthcare responders to
volunteer to assist in response activities in Maryland.
Variations in disaster types are not just limited to states dividing natural
disasters from disease-related emergencies, but also include states creating
multiple levels of a broadly defined state of emergency. For example,
Tennessee law defines three types of disasters: “catastrophic disaster,” “major
disaster,” and “minor disaster.”57 A catastrophic disaster is “a disaster that will
require massive state and federal assistance, including immediate military
involvement.”58 A major disaster is “a disaster that will likely exceed local
capabilities and require a broad range of state and federal assistance.”59 A
minor disaster is one that “is likely to be within the response capabilities of
local government and to result in only a minimal need for state or federal
assistance.”60
These unique disaster types in Tennessee correspond with unique
authorities. For example, volunteer healthcare providers, including hospitals
and community mental healthcare centers, can only receive liability protections
during a catastrophic or major disaster.61 The law does not provide liability
protections during declared minor disasters. In states with laws like
Tennessee’s, responders do not only need to parse out which powers align with

57

TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-2-101(5) (West 2014).
Id. § 58-2-101(5)(A).
59
Id. § 58-2-101(5)(B).
60
Id. § 58-2-101(5)(C).
61
Id. § 58-2-107(l) (“(1) If the governor of Tennessee declares an emergency in response to a
catastrophic or major disaster, voluntary health care providers, including hospitals and community mental
health care centers, participating in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact or Southern Regional
Emergency Management Assistance Compact are immune from liability in providing the health care to victims
or evacuees of the catastrophic or major disaster, as long as the services are provided within the limits of the
provider’s license, certification or authorization, unless an act or omission was the result of gross negligence or
willful misconduct. (2) If additional medical resources are required, the governor, by executive order, may
provide limited liability protection to health care providers, including hospitals and community mental health
care centers and those licensed, certified or authorized under titles 33, 63 or 68, and who render services within
the limits of their license, certification or authorization to victims or evacuees of such emergencies; provided,
however, that this protection may not include any act or omission caused by gross negligence or willful
misconduct. (3) The duration of the protection provided by this subsection (l) shall not exceed thirty (30) days,
but may be extended by the governor by executive order for an additional thirty (30) days, if required to ensure
the provision of emergency medical services in response to the catastrophic or major disaster.”).
58
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disease-related versus weather-related emergencies—but they might also need
to determine which authorities align with different levels of destruction.
Qualifying liability protections by type of emergency can confuse
responders and dissuade them from helping when and where they are needed
most.62 When emergency response teams are short staffed, affected
communities take longer to recover. In 2016, the National Association of
County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) released a report that analyzed
survey responses from 2,533 local health authorities.63 Of those, only 44%
reported to NACCHO that they had reviewed legal authorities relevant to
emergency preparedness and response.64 Presumably, those jurisdictions can
expect specific emergency declarations to activate specific response
authorities, and might have built those triggers into plans and exercises. Yet,
even in such jurisdictions, confusion regarding which powers correspond with
which declaration could still occur. For the 56% of local health departments
that did not report having reviewed legal authorities for response, the problems
that ensue could be even worse. Health authorities can minimize this kind of
confusion by streamlining emergency declarations for all hazard types and
allowing only one entity to declare a state of emergency.
The emergency declaration authorities discussed in this Part serve as a vital
first step in activating emergency powers and procedures to aid in disaster
response. In theory, the utility of emergency declarations may extend to many
specific areas of law, such as scopes of practice, procurement, and the
collection and use of individuals’ health data. In reality, the legal barriers to an
effective response may only become apparent once a disaster has struck,
making it difficult to anticipate exactly how a declaration should be utilized.
The following Part will discuss a solution many—but not all—states have

62
“In a recent survey designed by the American Public Health Association . . . [a]lmost seventy percent
of respondents answered that immunity from civil lawsuits would be an important (35.6%) or essential
(33.8%) factor when considering whether to volunteer in an emergency.” Sharona Hoffman, Responders’
Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1917 (2008). In
discussing the ambiguities surrounding various emergency response laws, Hodge and Anderson argue that
“emergency managers, public health practitioners, healthcare workers, volunteers, and others may not be able
to fully determine the legality of their actions during emergencies. Some responders may act without
significant regard for any legal ramifications; others may choose not to act at all because of this legal
uncertainty. Neither of these consequences is acceptable because each has the potential to ‘stymie [important]
public health interventions.’” Hodge & Anderson, supra note 18, at 272 (alteration in original).
63
NAT’L ASS’N OF CTY. & CITY HEALTH OFFICIALS, 2016 NATIONAL PROFILE OF LOCAL HEALTH
DEPARTMENTS 12 (2016), http://nacchoprofilestudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ProfileReport_Final3b.
pdf.
64
Id. at 104.
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developed to address this challenge: granting state governors the broad
authority to remove legal barriers to an emergency response.
II. GUBERNATORIAL EMERGENCY SUSPENSION AUTHORITIES ARE
NECESSARY FOR AN ADEQUATELY FLEXIBLE LEGAL SYSTEM TO MITIGATE THE
EFFECTS OF UNFORESEEABLE THREATS AND THEIR IMPACT
One of the greatest tools to ensure legal systems can adapt in disaster
situations is the authority to suspend or waive legal requirements. Laws are the
“structures, norms, and rules that a society uses to resolve disputes, govern
itself, and order relations between members of the society.”65 Laws and legal
authorities “proscribe practices thought to threaten health and prescribe
practices thought to compliment it.”66 But because disasters stress existing
systems and resources, day-to-day legal requirements could hinder
communities facing disasters rather than help them.67 Consequently, some laws
include language that waives certain requirements during declared emergencies
that are specific to the authorities governed only by those specific laws.68
While these authority-specific waivers and suspensions are useful, they do not
provide the flexibility necessary to address unforeseen circumstances; such
flexibility is only provided by broad emergency suspension powers.
The utility and limitations of authority-specific waivers and suspensions
are demonstrated at both the federal and state levels. For example, Section
1135 of the Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to suspend requirements under Medicare, Medicaid, the
Children’s Health Insurance Program, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
upon a presidential emergency declaration and a public health emergency
determination by the Secretary of HHS.69 More recently, the 21st Century
Cures Act of 201670 allows the Secretary of HHS to waive requirements—
established by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)—regarding the federal
government’s collection of voluntary information after (1) declaring a public
health emergency under the Public Health Service Act and (2) determining that
65

LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE xxv (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
Wendy E. Parmet, Introduction: The Interdependency of Law and Public Health, in LAW IN PUBLIC
HEALTH PRACTICE, supra note 65, at xxvii, xxxi.
67
“[P]rovisions of existing laws designed for normal, non-emergency circumstances may sometimes
hinder emergency response efforts, thereby potentially endangering the public’s health rather than protecting
it.” Orenstein, supra note 8, at 73.
68
Id. (“Many states authorize waivers during declared emergencies . . . .”).
69
42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (2012).
70
21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
66
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the emergency necessitates a waiver of the PRA.71 However, this waiver was
added only after the federal government was forced to meet the PRA
requirements during responses to recent disease outbreaks.72
States have used the same methods to add flexibility to their legal systems
through statute- or regulation-specific waivers and suspensions. One domain in
which states have provided authority-specific flexibility in declared
emergencies is in the context of vaccination authorities.73 Laws governing the
administration of vaccines by pharmacists can be complex and full of
conditions.74 As of 2016, every state and the District of Columbia has granted
pharmacists some form of authority to vaccinate individuals.75 However,
pharmacists’ authority to vaccinate can come with many limitations, including
limits on the ages of individuals who can receive a vaccination,76 the types of
vaccinations that may be administered, how those vaccines may be
administered,77 and requirements for third-party authorization.78 Some of the
most complex limitations mandate the age at which one can receive certain
71

Id. § 3087 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d).
For example, the CDC was required to file at least twelve notices of “Agency Forms Undergoing
Paperwork Reduction Act Review” for forms related to the Zika response between May 23, 2016 and August
3, 2017. See, e.g., Agency Forms Undergoing Paperwork Reduction Act Review, 82 Fed. Reg. 36,147 (Aug. 3,
2017); Agency Forms Undergoing Paperwork Reduction Act Review, 82 Fed. Reg. 32,554 (July 14, 2017);
Agency Forms Undergoing Paperwork Reduction Act Review, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,063 (July 5, 2017); Agency
Forms Undergoing Paperwork Reduction Act Review, 82 Fed. Reg. 26,930 (June 12, 2017); Agency Forms
Undergoing Paperwork Reduction Act Review, 82 Fed. Reg. 18,464 (Apr. 19, 2017); Agency Forms
Undergoing Paperwork Reduction Act Review, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,835 (Apr. 6, 2017); Agency Forms
Undergoing Paperwork Reduction Act Review, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,098 (Oct. 14, 2016); Agency Forms
Undergoing Paperwork Reduction Act Review, 81 Fed. Reg. 52,694 (Aug. 9, 2016); Agency Forms
Undergoing Paperwork Reduction Act Review, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,677 (July 18, 2016); Agency Forms
Undergoing Paperwork Reduction Act Review, 81 Fed. Reg. 44,866 (July 11, 2016); Agency Forms
Undergoing Paperwork Reduction Act Review, 81 Fed. Reg. 44,865 (July. 11, 2016); Agency Forms
Undergoing Paperwork Reduction Act Review, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,332 (May 23, 2016).
73
Cason D. Schmit & Matthew S. Penn, Expanding State Laws and a Growing Role for Pharmacists in
Vaccination Services, 57 J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N 661, 662 (2017) (“In some cases, statutes will provide
governors authority to modify statutory or regulatory requirements in specified circumstances and may allow
governors to expand pharmacists’ vaccination authority for outbreak response after declaring a state of
emergency.”).
74
Leila Barraza et al., The Latest in Vaccine Policies: Selected Issues in School Vaccinations,
Healthcare Worker Vaccinations, and Pharmacist Vaccination Authority Laws, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 16, 18
(2017).
75
Id. (citing Cason Schmit & Allison Reddick, Pharmacist Vaccination Laws, POLICY SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM: A LAWATLAS PROJECT, http://lawatlas.org/datasets/pharmacist-vaccination (last updated Jan. 1,
2016)); see also Schmit & Reddick, supra (“This is a longitudinal dataset, displaying laws across all 50 states
and the District of Columbia between January 1, 1990 and January 1, 2016.”).
76
Barraza et al., supra note 74, at 18.
77
For example, as of 2015, Nevada limits pharmacist vaccination to nasal and injectable modes only,
excluding oral and topical administration. Schmit & Reddick, supra note 75.
78
Barraza et al., supra note 74, at 18.
72
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vaccines from a pharmacist.79 These complexities can create major barriers to
achieving herd immunity in a pandemic, especially as new vaccines are
developed or as “changes in recommendations for existing vaccines (e.g.,
expanded populations, changes in dosing) . . . make it difficult for state policy
makers to keep pace.”80
Still, few states specifically exempt limitations on pharmacist vaccination
authorities during formal emergency declarations. Prior to 2002, no states had
such exceptions.81 That year, New Mexico was the first to modify its
pharmacist vaccination laws to include specific exceptions for disasters;
Virginia followed in 2003.82 As of 2015, of the forty-seven states that grant
pharmacists express authority to vaccinate,83 only ten states explicitly provided
exceptions in their pharmacist vaccination laws for state-declared
emergencies.84 In the remaining jurisdictions, responders must find alternative
legal mechanisms that allow for exceptions to pharmacist vaccination
authorities, or must seek out other types of healthcare professionals to
administer vaccines.
Unfortunately, relying on authority-specific waivers is only part of the
solution. Used alone, authority-specific waivers require lawmakers to either
anticipate how a disaster response might impact all authorities and build
relevant provisions into law, or else add the waiver to the law after an
emergency occurs (as was the case with the PRA waiver).85 States must
implement far more flexible solutions to deal with unforeseen threats.
The most adaptable method by far is allowing governors to suspend any
statutes or regulations that inhibit response upon the declaration of an

79
For example, in Minnesota, a patient must be at least six to be administered influenza vaccines, but
must be at least thirteen to be administered all other vaccines. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.01 (West Supp. 2017)
(“‘Practice of pharmacy’ means: . . . (5) participation in administration of influenza vaccines to all eligible
individuals six years of age and older and all other vaccines to patients 13 years of age . . . .”).
80
Barraza et al., supra note 74, at 18.
81
Schmit & Reddick, supra note 75.
82
Id.
83
Schmit & Penn, supra note 73, at 665.
84
Schmit & Reddick, supra note 75; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1974(E)(2) (Supp. 2017) &
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 4-23-411(A)(6) (2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 465.189(1)(c) (West Supp. 2017); IND.
CODE ANN. § 25-26-13-31.2(d) (West Supp. 2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 315.500 (West 2011); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 6802(22) (McKinney Supp. 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-307(4)–(8) (West Supp. 2016); VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-3408(P) (West Supp. 2017); MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.174.503(2) (2017); N.M. CODE R.
§ 16.19.4.9(C)(16)(c) (LexisNexis 2017); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 63.9(b)(1)(ii)(b) (2017); OR.
ADMIN. R. 855-019-0270(4) (2017).
85
See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
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emergency. This tool has proved exceptionally useful. The 2015 HIV outbreak
in Scott County, Indiana, demonstrated the efficiency of gubernatorial
emergency suspension authorities as a means to remove legal barriers while
legislative solutions are being pursued.
The HIV outbreak began with eleven confirmed cases in January; typically,
the county saw fewer than five cases per year.86 After an investigation,
officials concluded that the cases “were linked to syringe-sharing partners
injecting the prescription opioid oxymorphone.”87 The county deployed a
multifaceted response to prevent additional cases from spreading through
shared needles.88 This included “a public education campaign, establishment of
an incident command center and a community outreach center, short-term
authorization of syringe exchange, and support for comprehensive medical
care, including HIV and hepatitis C virus care and treatment as well as
substance abuse counseling and treatment.”89 However, Indiana law prohibited
the operation of needle exchanges at the time; violating the prohibition was
punishable by criminal and civil penalties.90 To remove this legal barrier, thenGovernor Mike Pence declared an emergency on March 26, 2015.91 By
activating response authorities, the Governor gained the power to “[s]uspend
the provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct
of state business, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency if strict
compliance with any of these provisions would in any way prevent, hinder, or
delay necessary action in coping with the emergency.”92 This enabled the
Governor to suspend all statutes that would inhibit the operation of a needle
exchange program to address the Scott County HIV epidemic, including any
associated civil and criminal penalties.93 The suspension authority allowed
responders to act immediately.94 In the meantime, the Indiana state legislature
spent time crafting a longer-term solution to allow counties to establish needleexchange programs.95 Absent the governor’s agile emergency suspension

86
Caitlin Conrad et al., Community Outbreak of HIV Infection Linked to Injection Drug Use of
Oxymorphone — Indiana, 2015, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 443, 443 (2015).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
IND. CODE ANN. §16-42-19-18 (West Supp. 2017); id. § 35-48-4-8.5(a)–(b); id. § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1).
91
Ind. Exec. Order No. 15-05 (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac/20150401-IRGOV150079EOA.xml.pdf.
92
IND. CODE ANN. § 10-14-3-12(d)(1).
93
Ind. Exec. Order, supra note 91.
94
Id.
95
This response was codified in chapter 7.5 to title 41 of the Indiana Code and went into effect in May
2015. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-7.5-1.
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authority, responders would have been forced to wait until the state legislature
was able to convene and act to remove the legal barrier to an effective
response.
A gubernatorial emergency suspension authority lets states remove legal
barriers quickly and effectively to aid a response effort. However, this power is
not available in all states and not for all types of legal barriers. In a recent
study, researchers from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
Public Health Law Program and the National Nurse-Led Care Consortium:
Public Health Management Corporation analyzed the laws of the fifty states
and the District of Columbia, to determine which jurisdictions authorize
governors to broadly amend or suspend laws under a state-declared
emergency.96 Researchers found that forty-two state governors possess the
authority to suspend either statutes or regulations during a disaster.97 While
forty-two of fifty-one jurisdictions might appear to be a near uniform adoption
of this authority by states, upon closer examination, the data show that this
authority extends to statutory requirements in only thirty-five of the states.98
Yet, both regulations and statutes outline how the government should respond
to emergencies. With that in mind, fifteen states and the District of Columbia
cannot, under express authority, look to their government’s chief executive to
remove statutory barriers to effectuate an efficient response.99 Those
jurisdictions would either need to respond in a way that complied with existing
laws or seek other means to removing legal barriers.100 Gubernatorial
emergency declaration authorities that allow for the suspension of statutes and
regulations provide response leaders with a streamlined tool that is adaptable to
all manner of unforeseen threats.

96
Kelly Thompson & Nick Anderson, Emergency Suspension Powers, POLICY SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM: A LAWATLAS PROJECT, http://lawatlas.org/datasets/emergency-powers (last updated June 1, 2016).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Brooke Courtney et al. argue that while states were able to utilize a variety of legal mechanisms to
expand practitioner scopes of practice during the 2009 H1N1 Influenza pandemic, and no data is available to
suggest that the diverse approaches inhibited the response, “[diverse approaches] could lead to significant
response challenges, delays in providing care, and confusion during more catastrophic public health
emergencies.” Brooke Courtney et al., Expanding Practitioner Scopes of Practice During Public Health
Emergencies: Experiences from the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Vaccination Efforts, 8 BIOSECURITY &
BIOTERRORISM 223, 229 (2010).

SUNSHINE GALLEYPROOFS2

414

3/30/2018 9:28 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:397

CONCLUSION
Threats can take many forms. Some are predictable, but many are not. The
U.S. emergency response system has rightfully adopted an all-hazards
approach to dealing with threats. This approach requires uniform systems of
response leadership. The adoption of NIMS as the de facto organizational
structure for all types of threats, including natural disasters, oil spills, and
disease emergencies, evinces this approach’s strength. NIMS is characterized
by a clear chain of command and a flexible organizational structure.101 Our
legal emergency response system must possess these traits, too. To that end,
emergency response authorities should be centralized—not dispersed among
groups of officials and various types of emergency declarations. Further, an
adaptable legal system must be able to remove legal barriers, both seen and
unforeseen. While legislatures and executive branch officials have anticipated
some legal issues and built emergency waivers into legislation, an agile legal
system allows governors to suspend both statutes and regulations for the period
necessitated by a disaster. With a streamlined and adaptable emergency
response system that does not divide vital authorities across various declaration
types and provides a unilateral power to remove statutory and regulatory
barriers to effective responses, disaster responders can ensure as quick and
efficient a response as possible in a world of ever-changing threats.

101

U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 1, at 6; see also supra text accompanying note 5.

